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 THE  IMPACT  OF  BOARD  CHARACTERISTICS  ON  THE     FINANCIAL 
 PERFORMANCE OF TANZANIAN FIRMS 
 Abstract 
 
Purpose - This study investigates the impact of board characteristics on the   financial 
performance  of  listed  firms  in  Tanzania.  Board  characteristics,  including  outside 
directors, board size, CEO/ Chair duality, gender diversity, board skill and foreign 
directors   are   addressed   in   the   Tanzanian   context   by   applying   two corporate 
governance theories: namely, agency theory; and resource dependence theory. 
Design/methodology/approach  -  The  paper  uses  balanced  panel  data  regression 
analysis on 80 firm-years observations (2006-2013) from annual reports and semi- 
structured interviews were conducted with 12 key stakeholders. The study uses also a 
mixed methods approach and applies a convergent parallel design (Creswell, 2011) to 
integrate quantitative and qualitative data. 
Findings - It was found that in terms of agency theory, while the findings support the 
separation of CEO/Chairperson roles; they do not support outside   directors-financial 
performance linkage. With regard to resource dependence theory, the findings suggest 
that gender diversity has a positive impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the 
findings do not support an association between financial performance and board  size, 
PhD qualification, and foreign directors. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications - The study contributes to the understanding 
of  board-performance  link  and  provides  academic  evidence  to  policy  makers   in 
Tanzania for current and future governance reforms. 
Originality/value - The findings contribute to the literature by providing new and 
original insights that, within a developing setting, extend current understanding of the 
association   between   corporate   governance   and   financial   performance.   This is 
predicated, also, on the use of uncommon mixed methods approach. 
Keywords Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Board Characteristics, Firm 
Performance, Tanzania 
Paper type Research Paper 
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 THE  IMPACT  OF  BOARD  CHARACTERISTICS  ON  THE     FINANCIAL 
 PERFORMANCE OF TANZANIAN FIRMS 
  
 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate  governance  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  economy  since  it  ensures 
returns to investors by minimising associated investment risks and, hence, contributes 
 to companies’ performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Boards of directors play a 
fundamental  role  in  strengthening  corporate  governance  by  accomplishing       the 
important roles of monitoring and advising on the provision of resources (Tricker, 
2012; Ntim, 2015). 
Corporate governance has attracted a multitude of studies to examine the  relationship 
between  board  characteristics  and  financial  performance  (Ntim,  2015).  However, 
 these studies relate to more widely researched developed countries and cannot be 
generalised  to  other  countries  due  to  the  differences  in  corporate       governance 
structures and cultures (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Tricker, 2012; Arora and  Sharma, 
2016).  In  their  paper,  Kang  et  al.  (2007)  call  for  a  country-specific     corporate 
governance-performance study to be conducted. Despite this call, there is still a dearth 
of corporate governance literature in most emerging economies (Ntim, 2015; Darko et 
al., 2016). 
Tanzania, as an emerging economy located in Sub-Saharan Africa, has possibly a  
 unique corporate governance environment when compared to developed    economies. 
For example, its stock market, the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), is one of the 
 smallest capital markets in the world (Ntim, 2012). Moreover, due to socialism, the 
 country’s economy is still suffering from a considerable failure of its state-owned 
enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s (Fulgence, 2014). There are, also, weak legal   and 
regulatory controls (Fulgence, 2014). Tanzania has been pursuing economic   reforms
 
 since   the   mid-1980s.   Major   corporate   governance-related   reforms   include the 
enactment of the Capital Markets and Securities Act (1994) and the establishment   of 
the  Capital  Markets  and  Securities  Authority  (CMSA)  in  1995.  Also,  DSE  was 
 incorporated in  1996. Moreover,  in  2002,  the Company  Act was  enacted and    the 
 CMSA’s  corporate  governance  guidelines  were  developed  to  improve Tanzania’s 
corporate governance. Most of these corporate governance laws and guidelines   were 
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(Bentahar  and  Cameron, 2015) 
 
 
adopted  from  developed  economies.  Since  these  reforms,  very  few        corporate 
governance studies have been done in Tanzania (Fulgence, 2014), possibly due to  the 
 lack of interest and awareness of the country’s corporate governance. Therefore, it   is 
 worthwhile to use Tanzania as a case study in examining the relationship between 
board characteristics and financial performance. 
 The study aims to provide insights to answering the following central question: do 
 board characteristics have an impact on the financial performance of the Tanzanian 
firms? In order to answer this question, the study applies the mixed method  approach 
 to investigate the impact of the following board aspects: namely, outside directors, 
board size, CEO duality, gender diversity and foreign directors on a firm’s financial 
performance. These aspects are believed to be essential since the board of directors 
plays a major role in enhancing sound corporate governance of listed firms   (Ujunwa, 
 2012).  Furthermore,  CMSA’s  guidelines  (2002)  outline  these  aspects  as being 
 important for sound corporate governance practices in the Tanzanian context. 
Since  very  little  is  known  about  corporate  governance  in  Tanzania,  our  study
 
 contributes  further  to  the  understanding  of  the  relationship  between corporate 
 governance  and  financial  performance  by  using  Tanzanian  data.  Also, the study 
addresses  the  endogeneity  challenges  by  taking  into  account  the endogenous 
 relationships between board characteristics and financial performance.    Furthermore, 
the application of the uncommon mixed methods approach may provide more insight 
 into  the  research question
.  The  rest  of  the study 
comprises a literature review and hypotheses development, methodology, empirical 
findings, discussion and the conclusion. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 No single theory explains the general pattern of links between the characteristics of 
 boards of directors and firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Jackling and 
Johl,  2009).  The  study  of  corporate  governance  and  performance  relationship are 
 based   on   various   conflicting   theoretical   perspectives   such   as   agency  theory, 
 stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, institution theory and managerial 
theory.  It  is  argued  that  these  conflicting  theories  have  resulted  in    inconsistent 
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empirical findings on the corporate governance-performance relationship (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003). Nonetheless, the previous studies on the relationship between board 
 characteristics and  financial  performance  based  their  arguments usually  on agency 
 and resource dependence theories (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012; Ntim, 
2015). 
 Agency  theory  assumes  that  separation  of  ownership  and  control  can  result  in a 
 conflict of interest between management and shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) since executives are self-interested and opportunist and 
have dissimilar objectives and risk preferences (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency 
 theorists believe that a board’s primary responsibility is to monitor executives in order 
 to protect the shareholders from conflict of interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  It is 
argued that board of directors is an essential mechanism in monitoring and controlling 
 executives from pursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders’ wealth 
 (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Darko et al., 2016). The Agency theory recommends a 
 large number of independent outside directors on board and separation of the Chief 
Executive  Officer  (CEO)  and  Chairperson  of  the  Board  (COB)  roles  in  order to 
 enhance  the  board’s  independence  and  to  discharge  its  oversight  role  effectively 
 (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
From resource dependence theory viewpoint, an organisation is not self-sustainable 
 due to limited resources and has to link with the external environment in order to 
 flourish (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The resource dependence theory argues that  the 
board of directors is the cornerstone to the organisation’s external environment   since 
it can tap into the essential external resources such as financial and human capital,
 
 technology and relevant information (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). These resources can 
 improve   the   effectiveness   of   the   firm’s   strategic   decision-making   (Kiel  and 
Nicholson,   2003;   Arora   and   Sharma,   2016)   and   can   increase   its legitimacy 
 (Lückerath-Rovers,  2013).  Resource  dependence  theory  favours  large  board  size, 
 presence  of  women,  skilled  and  foreign  directors  on  board  in  order  to       make 
 connections with the firm’s external environment (Ujunwa, 2012;   Lückerath-Rovers, 
2013). 
This study is premised on agency and resource dependence theories. These theories 
argue that board characteristics may have a significant impact on the firm’s   financial 
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performance (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012). Additionally, both agency and
resource dependence theories can explain the boards’ key functions of monitoring, 
 advising and the provision of resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Ntim, 2015). The 
 assumptions, related to agency and resource dependence theories, aim at increasing 
the board effectiveness and are most applicable in an environment where there is an 
inefficient  regulatory  system  (Udayasankar  et  al.,  2005).  For  instance,  most Sub-
 
 Saharan Africa countries including Tanzania are claimed to have a weak regulatory 
system (Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
The literature review addresses each of this aspect of corporate governance  regarding 
 the  financial  performance.  Furthermore,  the  literature  review  and  this    section’s 
 development of hypotheses is within the context of agency and resource   dependence 
theories. 
Outside Directors 
Outside  directors  can  be  independent  when  they  do  not  have  any  affiliation that 
affects the independence of their decision-making (Tricker, 2012). Theoretically, it  is 
 argued from agency perspectives that a large proportion of outside directors on the 
 board   enhances   board   independence   and   safeguards   owners’   resources   from 
management conflicts of interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless,  different 
 studies  have  provided  mixed  findings  of  the  outside  directors’  impact  on  firms’ 
 financial  performance.  For  example,  Bhagat  and  Bolton  (2013)  and  Malik     and 
Makhdoom (2016) found that independent directors have a positive impact on the
firm’s financial performance. Conversely, Kumar and Singh (2012) and Arora and 
 Sharma (2016) found that there were negative relationships between outside  directors 
 and firms’ financial performance. However, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006),    Rodriguez- 
Fernandez  et  al.  (2014)  and  Afrifa  and  Tauringana  (2015)  did  not  find  any
relationship between outside directors and firm performance. The CMSA’s guidelines
 
 (2002), stipulate that a board should comprise of at least one-third independent non- 
 executive directors. Proponents of agency theory argue that a large proportion of 
outside directors can provide effective monitoring of the firm’s executives (Fama  and 
 Jensen, 1983; Jackling and Johl, 2009). Henceforth, based on agency theory, the   first 
 hypothesis is: 
 5  
such as providing the board with limited information about   a 
supported  by  the  following  studies  (e.g. 
Donaldson and Davis (1991), found   a 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance. 
CEO Duality 
CEO duality may be defined as the joint roles of the CEO and COB being carried  out 
by one person. CEO duality has been blamed for the inefficiency of the boards of
 
 collapsed giant US companies such as Enron and WorldCom (Jackling and Johl, 
 2009). Agency theorists argue that CEO duality can entice the CEO to lead the   board 
 in favour of executives 
 firm (Ujunwa, 2012). Agency theory recommends the separation of the role of the 
 CEO and COB in order to enhance effective monitoring of the board and to avoid 
CEO entrenchment (Mahadeo et al., 2012) 
 Empirical evidence on the impact of CEO duality on the firm’s financial  performance 
 reflects  the  on-going  theoretical  opposition.  For  instance,  agency  theory        was 
Kyereboah-Coleman  and  Biekpe,  2006; 
Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ujunwa, 2012); these all found a negative relationship  between 
CEO  duality  and  the  firm’s  financial  performance.  Conversely,  other  studies, for 
 example, positive  relationship  between CEO 
duality and firm performance. Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. 
 (2014) and Arora and Sharma (2016), did not find any relationship between CEO 
 duality and firm performance. The CMSA’s guidelines (2002) stipulate that the role
 and  responsibilities of COB and CEO should be separated. Consequently, this paper 
takes  the  agency  theory  view  that  CEO  duality  can  enhance  CEO entrenchment, 
 impair board independence and, hence, make the board less effective in its monitoring 
 role (Ujunwa, 2012). We, therefore, hypothesise that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and Tanzanian listed firms’
 
financial performance. 
Board Size 
 Resource  dependence  perspectives  favour  a  large  board  since  it  can        enhance 
 connections between a firm and external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; 
Guest,  2009;  Tricker,  2012;  Lückerath-Rovers,  2013).  However,  from  a decision- 
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making  perspective,  small  boards  are  suggested  since  they  can  enhance effective 
decision-making (Yermack, 1996). There has been some  empirical evidence,    which 
supports the argument that an increase in board size has a positive impact on firm  
financial performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman and    Biekpe, 
2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009). In contrast, other studies found that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Guest,   2009;
 
 Afrifa and Tauringana, 2015; Arora and Sharma, 2016; Malik and Makhdoom, 2016). 
 Some studies, such as those by Ferrer and Bandelipe (2012) and Garba and Abubakar 
(2014), did not find any link between board size and firm financial performance.   The 
 CMSA’s guidelines (2002) recommend that boards should provide wider expertise 
 and skills to improve their effectiveness. Based on resource dependence theory    view 
that large board size can provide a firm with greater access to resources, such as 
expertise and capital from the external environment (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).   The 
following hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board size and Tanzanian listed firms’ 
financial performance. 
Gender Diversity 
It is common to see none or very few women on boards (tokenism) in developing 
 countries (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Abdullah et al., 2016). Theoretically, from   resource 
 dependence theory, it is claimed that women on a board can reassure stakeholders   of 
the  firm’s  diversity;  increase  its  legitimacy;  and  the  connection  with  its external 
environment (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Furthermore, agency theory proponents argue 
 that female directors can play a big role in minimising agency costs since they can 
bring new insights to boards and make complex decisions (Carter et al., 2003). 
There is mixed empirical evidence on the female directors’ impact on firm financial
 
 performance. For example, Mahadeo et al. (2012), Lückerath-Rovers (2013), Ntim 
 (2015)  and  Abdullah   et  al.  (2016)  found  a  positive  relationship  between       the 
proportion  of  women  on  boards  and  firm  performance.  Conversely,  Ahern    and 
 Dittmar  (2012)  found  a  negative  relationship,  and  Marimuthu  and Kolandaisamy 
 (2009)  did  not  find  any  link  between  the  ratio  of  women  on  boards  and    firm 
performance.  The  CMSA’s  guidelines  (2002)  recommend  that  the  process        of 
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directors’ appointment should be sensitive to gender representation. Based on the 
resource dependence theories view that women on boards can enhance the firm’s 
 legitimacy and can provide more connections with the external environment (Carter et 
 al., 2003). Accordingly the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: Women on boards improve Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance 
Board Skill 
Knowledge and skills can enhance directors’ critical thinking that is essential in 
discharging their  main  roles  of  monitoring,  advisory  and  providing       important 
 resources  (Tricker,  2012).  Resource  dependence  theory  argues  that  a  board      of 
director’s  linkage  with  the  external  environment  can  bring  diverse  skills        and 
knowledge to the firm (Francis et al., 2015) 
Some corporate governance studies, such as by Ujunwa (2012) and Francis et al. 
(2015), found that board skill could have a positive influence on firm performance. In 
 contrast, Van-Ness et al. (2010) found a negative relationship between board skill and 
 firm  performance,  while  Kim  and  Rasheed  (2014)  did  not  find  any  board  skill- 
performance linkage. The CMSA’s guidelines (2002) encourage the board    members 
with appropriate skills for discharging their roles. Therefore, based on the resource 
 dependence theory argument that directors bring expertise to the board (Francis et  al., 
 2015), the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 H5: The number of directors with doctoral qualifications is positively associated  with 
 Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance. 
Foreign Directors 
Foreign investors are likely to hire foreign directors to protect their interests abroad 
(Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). Resource dependence theory proponents assert that 
foreign directors can bring a range of experiences, cultural differences, and skills 
 from other countries to a board and, hence, can bring new outlooks and problem- 
 solving capabilities (Ujunwa, 2012). 
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There is, also, mixed empirical evidence on the foreign directors’ impact on firm 
financial  performance.  Ujunwa  (2012)  found  that  foreign  directors  could  have  a 
 positive influence on performance. Other studies, such as those by Jhunjhunwala  and 
 Mishra (2012), found an insignificant positive relationship. Therefore, based on the 
argument  of  proponents  of  resource  dependence  theory  that  foreign  directors can 
provide the board with connections to foreign networks and capital (Ujunwa, 2012),
 
we hypothesise that: 
H6: Foreign directors are positively associated with Tanzanian listed firms’   financial 
performance. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the study applied the uncommon mixed 
 methods  approach  in  the  form  of  a  convergent  parallel  design  (Creswell,  2011). 
 Mixed  methods  approach  is  a  research  methodology  that  includes  the collection, 
analysis  and  mixing  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  data  (Creswell,  2011).    This 
approach enriches the validity and reliability of the study’s findings (Bentahar and 
 Cameron, 2015). Furthermore, it provides a broader insight to answering the  research 
 question  (Johnson  et al., 2007). Finally,  the use of semi-structured  interviews    can 
provide practical based solutions to answering the research question (Bryman, 2016). 
 In line with previous studies, such as Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012), this study gives 
 more priority to the quantitative findings since the quantitative approach is argued   to 
be more appropriate in determining the cause and effect relationship (Bryman,  2016). 
 Numerous  corporate  governance  studies,  such  as  Jackling  and  Johl  (2009)    and 
 Ujunwa (2012), used the quantitative approach to examine the relationship between 
aspects  of  board  characteristics  and  financial  performance.  We  used    qualitative 
findings to complement the quantitative findings and to increase the study’s validity 
 and substantiate the findings (Johnson et al., 2007; Ferrer and Banderlipe, 2012). In 
 line with Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012), the quantitative and qualitative findings are 
brought together in this study’s results and discussion sub-section in order to  provide 
a broader insight (Creswell, 2011).
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Qualitatively and consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib’s (2007) research, we employed 
the semi-structured interviews method. This method is argued to be more flexible and 
 compatible  with  other  methods  of  data  analysis  (Bryman,  2016). Semi-structured 
 interviews were conducted with 12 key stakeholders in corporate governance. In   line 
with Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), we targeted members of the boards of Tanzanian 
listed  companies,  regulators  and  other  stakeholders  as  this  study’s     participants
 
because  of  their  rich  knowledge  and  experience  of  corporate  governance.     This 
 enhanced their effective participation in the interviews. The selection of    participants 
was based on judgmental and snowball sampling. Judgemental sampling increases the 
 quality   of   the   data   by   selecting   intentionally   the   knowledgeable   and skilled 
 participants (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Snowball sampling helps us to gain more 
 participants who are connected with initially selected participants (Bryman, 2016). 
The selected participants were nine board members (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7,   B8 
 and B9) from nine different Tanzanian listed firms, Regulators (senior officers)   from 
 CMSA and DSE (R1, R2), and a senior officer from Institute of Directors (R3). In 
conducting  interviews,  the  study  took  account  of  ethical  procedures  in  order   to 
safeguard the interests, privacy, and dignity of the participants (Bryman, 2016). 
 We  developed  an  interview  guide  framework  based  on  the  research      questions 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015) (see Appendix 1). Similar   to previous studies on corporate 
governance (for example, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) and in order to make sense of 
collected data, this study applied a thematic analysis approach (Boyatzis, 1998).   The 
 thematic  analysis  identifies,  analyses,  and  reports  patterns  (themes)  within    data 
 (Braun  and  Clarke,  2006).  The  approach  can  be  applied  to  different   theoretical 
perspectives and is a useful research tool that, potentially, can provide a rich and 
 detailed account of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this study, 7 themes were
 
 developed based on the previous studies on corporate governance literature and the 
research questions (Boyatzis, 1998). These were board size, outside directors, CEO 
duality, foreign directors, gender diversity, board skill and board effectiveness. 
Quantitatively, data were collected from the OSIRIS financial database and from   the 
annual reports of firms listed on the DSE. This study used the census approach and, 
thus, the sampling frame consisted of all 18 firms listed on the DSE at the end of
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2013. Six firms, which belonged to the financial services industry, were excluded 
from the population due to the special regulatory environment in which they  operated 
 (Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
 Moreover, to balance a panel, five other firms were excluded from the sample because 
they did not have complete records of all data needed to measure the study’s variables 
within the period 2006-2013. The use of balanced panel data minimises the risk of
 
 endogeneity  and  multicollinearity  (Bhagat  and  Black,  2002;  Darko  et  al.,  2016). 
 Consequently, the final sample consisted of the remaining 10 Tanzanian firms listed 
on the DSE from 2006 to 2013 and produced a total sample of 80 observations over 
 the period. This study’s sample size is comparatively larger than some other corporate 
 governance  studies  in  developing  countries  (e.g.  Tsamenyi  et  al.,  2007; Weekes- 
Marshall, 2014).       We chose to start in 2006 since the Tanzania Company Act 2002 
came into force officially in 2006 and, from this time, Tanzanian listed firms started 
 to comply effectively with the Act’s requirements. Furthermore, it is believed that 
 already in 2006 most Tanzanian listed firms had implemented the IFRSs effectively 
after  they  were  introduced  officially  to  Tanzania  in  2004.  Since  the  data    were 
collected between January and March 2015, the sample ends in 2013 because this is
 
the most recent year for which data were available. 
Table 1 describes variables that are applied in this study. We use the following  model 
 to  analyse  the  relationship  between  board  characteristics  and  firm’s        financial 
 performance (Guest, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012; Mouselli and Hussainey, 2014): 
 Yit    =   α   +β1BSIZEit   +   β2OUTSIDEit   +   β3CEODit    +   Β4FODIRit+   β5EDIVit + 
 β6FEMDIRit + +Β7FDEBTit + β8FMSIZEit + β9FMAGEit + εit 
Where   Yit is alternatively ROAit and ROEit for ith firm at time t.   α is the intercept, βi  is the regression coefficient of ith  firm and εit  is the 
 composite error term. 
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Table 1: Data variables 
Variable Acronym Description 
Independent 
Variables: 
  
Outside directors BOUTSIDE The number of outside non-executive directors as 
a percentage or a proportion of the total number 
of directors on the board. 
Board size BSIZE The number of members who comprise the 
board of directors at the end of a financial year. 
CEO duality CEOD The practice, whereby a single individual is 
serving as both Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and board chair. It is measured by assigning 1 if 
CEO is not the chair and 0 if CEO is also the 
chair. 
Gender diversity FEMDIR The numbers of female directors as a percentage 
of the total number of directors on the board. 
Board skill BSKILL Competency and capabilities of the board 
members measured as the proportion of  directors 
with a doctoral qualification to the  total number 
of directors. 
Foreign Directors FODIR The proportion of foreign directors to the total 
number of directors 
Dependent 
Variables: 
  
Return on assets ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
Return on equity ROE Net Income divided by shareholders’ equity. 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table  2  presents  a  descriptive  statistics  summary  of  board  characteristics,    firm 
 characteristics, and financial performance. The average number of outside directors in 
the  sample  is  82%.  This  demonstrates  the  high  rate  of  compliance  with  CMSA 
guidelines (2002) and suggests that a board should comprise of at least one-third of 
 outside directors. The board size is between 5 and 12 and the mean value is 8; this is 
 consistent with Ujunwa’s (2012) findings. The maximum, minimum and mean  values 
of CEO duality are 0, 100% and 90% respectively. This denotes that 90% of the 
sampled listed companies comply with the CMSA guidelines (2002) to separate the
 
 role of the CEO and COB. Table 2 shows that the board members with doctorate 
 qualifications and female directors both average 9% of each firm’s board of directors. 
 In terms of foreign directors, the average number of foreign directors of the    sampled 
 firms is 61%. The average firm size and age in natural log of assets is 7.42 and 0.74 
respectively. The total firm leverage ranges between 0.23 and 6.6 of total assets,    and 
the average of the sampled firms is 1.55. This indicates that most Tanzanian listed 
 firms are by far financed by debt than equity financing. Table 2 demonstrates, also, 
 that the listed firms are financially steady, as measured by ROA (mean 17%) and 
ROE (mean 31%). The widespread use of financial performance measures and    other 
variables, as indicated in Table 2, shows that the sampled firms achieved a reasonable
 
variation (Ntim, 2013). 
Control 
variables: 
  
Firm debt FDEBT Financial leverage (total debt divided by total 
equity) 
Firm size FMSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
Firm age FMAGE Natural logarithm of the number of years which 
the firm has been listed on the Dar es Salaam 
Stock Exchange (DSE) 
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In line with Field’s (2014) findings, this study addresses significant linear regressions 
assumptions;   these   relate   to   fitting   a   linear   model   to   the   data.   These   are 
 multicollinearity, normality, linearity, homogeneity, and autocorrelation and, by using 
 tests of Pearson correlations, histograms and normal probability plots of  standardised 
residuals and plots of standardised residuals against standardised predicted values, 
Durbin-Watson of the variables. These results (available upon request) indicate that
 
the assumptions have been reasonably met. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of model variables for all (80) firm years 
Correlation Results 
Table 3 presents correlation matrixes for the variables under investigation. ROA is 
 negatively correlated with CEO duality and firm debt and is positively correlated with 
 gender diversity. ROE is positively correlated with gender diversity and board skill 
and marginally negatively correlated with CEO duality. CEO duality is correlated 
positively with outside directors and board skill. The possible explanation for this 
 finding is that there is a reduction in financial performance when there is CEO duality 
 (Ujunwa, 2012). It can be interpreted that the number of women on the board tends to 
mitigate the risk caused by debt. In line with Mahadeo et al.’s (2012) findings, gender 
No. of Std. 
 
Firm Debt (FDEBT) 
observation 
80 
Min 
0.23 
Max 
6.60 
Mean 
1.55 
Deviation 
1.66 
Firm Size (ln) (FMSIZE) 80 5.22 8.47 7.42 0.78 
Firm Age (ln) (FMAGE) 80 0.00 1.18 0.74 0.33 
Return on Asset (%) (ROA) 80 -8 47 17 14 
Return on Equity (%) (ROE) 80 -47 95 31 25 
Board Size (BSIZE) 80 5 12 7.71 2.26 
Outside Directors (BOUTSIDE) (%) 80 38 100 82 17 
CEO Duality (CEOD) 80 0 1 0.90 0.30 
Foreign Directors (FODIR) (%) 80 0 100 61 29 
Board Skill (BSKILL) (%) 80 0 29 9 9 
Gender Diversity (FEMDIR) (%) 80 0 36 9 10 
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diversity is associated, also, significantly and positively with numbers of directors 
with  doctoral  qualifications.  There  is  a  significant  and  positive  correlation   with 
 Foreign Directors. This is in line with Ujunwa’s (2012) findings and indicates that  an 
 increase  in  board  size  results,  also,  in  an  increase  in  the  proportion  of   foreign 
directors. This is due to the fact that foreign investors own most Tanzanian listed 
firms. Table 3 shows, also, that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are   below
 
 10. Multicollinearity can be detected by VIF and a value of 10 or above indicates 
 multicollinearity problem (Field, 2014). 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of the Variables for all (80) Firm Years 
 Significant at the 5% level (2 tailed). ** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
Regression Results and Discussion 
Table 4 below summarises the estimation results for OLS when using ROA and  ROE
 
 as the dependent variables. As Table 4 indicates, CEOD, BSIZE, FSIZE, FDEBT  and 
 FMAGE  exhibited  negative  coefficients,  while  other  variables  exhibited  positive 
coefficients. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 FDEBT 1 1.368 
2 FMSIZE -0.043 1          1.959 
  0.702            
3 FMAGE 0.012 -0.195 1         2.208 
  0.919 0.083           
4 ROA -.524** -0.012 -0.133 1         
  0.000 0.914 0.240          
5 ROE -0.078 -0.098 -0.111 .821** 1        
  0.490 0.386 0.325 0.000         
6 BSIZE .262* -0.196 -0.012 -0.169 0.053 1      2.038 
  0.019 0.081 0.916 0.134 0.642        
7 BOUTSIDE .307** -.314** -.304** -0.185 -0.028 0.058 1     3.887 
  0.006 0.005 0.006 0.100 0.803 0.607       
8 CEOD 0.218 -.318** -.222* -.337** -0.205 0.106 .774** 1    2.640 
  0.052 0.004 0.047 0.002 0.069 0.351 0.000      
9 FODIR .224* .424** -.544** -0.016 0.078 .463** -0.016 0.006 1   4.100 
  0.046 0.000 0.000 0.885 0.490 0.000 0.891 0.959     
10 BSKILL 0.108 0.169 -.264* 0.168 .262* 0.148 .388** .254* .384** 1  2.246 
  0.340 0.134 0.018 0.137 0.019 0.191 0.000 0.023 0.000    
11 FEMDIR -0.202 -0.077 0.105 .383** .409** 0.031 -0.125 -0.182 0.120 .342** 1 1.586 
  0.073 0.497 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.787 0.270 0.105 0.290 0.002   
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ROA ROE 
R2 51.70% 30.10% 
Table 4: OLS Regression Results 
*** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
(Constant) 
B 
0.733 
T 
3.282 
Sign 
0.002*** 
B 
1.101 
T 
2.326 
Sign 
0.023** 
VIF 
BSIZE -0.012 -1.590 0.116 -0.007 -0.442 0.660 2.038 
BOUTSIDE 0.139 1.005 0.319 0.202 0.690 0.492 3.887 
CEOD -0.225 -3.533 0.001*** -0.348 -2.581 0.012** 2.640 
FODIR 0.095 1.149 0.254 0.112 0.638 0.526 4.100 
BSKILL 0.286 1.520 0.133 0.516 1.291 0.201 2.246 
FEMDIR 0.256 1.688 0.096 0.737 2.293 0.025** 1.586 
FDEBT -0.039 -4.741 0.000*** -0.002 -0.128 0.899 1.368 
FSIZE -0.053 -2.496 0.015** -0.094 -2.091 0.040** 1.959 
FMAGE -0.045 -0.859 0.393 -0.097 -0.875 0.384 2.208 
 
Adjusted R2 
F-Statistics 
45.50% 
8.332*** 
21.20% 
3.356*** 
No. Of Observations 80 80 
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Outside directors 
As indicated in Table 4, the findings show an insignificant relationship and, hence, 
 the  first  hypothesis  H1  is  rejected.  The  findings  are  similar  with  those  of prior 
 findings  of  Bhagat  and  Black  (2002),  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006),  Ferrer    and 
Banderlipe (2012), and Afrifa and Tauringana (2015). However, the findings are 
inconsistent with CMSA’s guidelines (2002) and Bhagat and Bolton’s (2013) and 
 Malik and Makhdoom’s (2016) previous studies. The findings do not support the 
 argument of the agency theory that a large proportion of independent outside  
 directors is essential for the board to either monitor or oversee the firm’s  
 management in order to minimize agency costs (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jackling  
 and Johl 2009). 
 The results are in line with the argument of Interviewees B2, B6, B9, R1 and R3 that, 
 if they are independent and competent, the outside directors can have a positive 
 impact on the firm’s financial performance. Lack of independence may contribute  to 
 the outside directors’ insignificant performance since they may be ineffective in 
 monitoring the management (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006;  Ferrer and Banderlipe, 
 (2012).  Consistent with Fulgence (2014), interviewees B2, B3 and R3 argued that in 
 Tanzania, some of the directors might not be independent because the directors’ 
 appointment process is not fully transparent. 
 CEO duality 
The  findings  (Tables  4)  show  that  there  is  a  significantly  negative  relationship 
between ROA and ROE and CEO duality. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is accepted. The 
findings are in line with the requirements of CMSA’s guidelines (2002) and the 
 findings of previous studies such as Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Kyereboah-Coleman 
 and Biekpe (2006), Ujunwa (2012), and Shrivastav and Kalsie (2016). However,  the 
results are inconsistent with the earlier work of Donaldson and Davis (1991). The 
findings, support, also, the agency theory recommendations that the roles of CEO
 
 and  COB  should  be  separated  since  the  duality  impairs  board  independence by 
 enhancing CEO entrenchment and, hence, reducing    financial performance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ujunwa, 2012).    Similarly, a majority 
 of the interviewees (B1, B2, B3, B4, B6, B7, R1, R2 and R3) were of the same  view 
that, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the board, the roles of CEO and COB 
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should  be  separated  in  order  to  enhance  board  independence, accountability  and 
transparency. 
For instance interview B2 argued claimed, 
When you have CEO duality I think you loose an important control,   because
 
 it is like being the prosecutor and being the judge in your own case. Which of 
 course we know is unacceptable, even if one acts equitably it is difficult to 
convince people that there is an element of fairness. 
 (Interviewee B2) 
 Board size 
financial performance. Firstly, board size shows an insignificant relationship with 
 financial  performance  (see  Table  4).  Therefore,  hypothesis  H3  is  rejected.   The 
 findings support previous findings of Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012) and Garba and 
Abubakar (2014). Moreover, the theories of resource dependence, and agency, which 
favour large boards, are not supported (Garba and Abubakar, 2014). However, the
 
 findings are inconsistent with earlier works of Yermack (1996) and Jackling and Johl 
 (2009). The results are consistent with the interviewees’ views that board size    itself 
cannot guarantee financial performance (B2, B5, B9, R1 and R2). In line with Kim 
 and Rasheed (2014); they argued that a diversity of members with different expertise 
 matters more. The results suggest that lack of mixed skills of expertise may render  a 
board to be ineffective. 
 Gender diversity 
 As indicated in Table 4, the findings show a significant positive relationship between 
gender diversity and ROE and a marginally significant one with ROA. Thus, the first 
hypothesis H4 is accepted. The findings support prior studies of Mahadeo et al.
 
 (2012) Lückerath-Rovers (2013), Ntim (2015), and Abdullah et al. (2016) which also 
 indicate   that   gender   diversity   is   positively   related   with   firm    performance. 
Nevertheless,  the  results  are  inconsistent  with  Marimuthu  and    Kolandaisamy’s 
 (2009) and Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) earlier works. Theoretically, the findings 
 support the resource dependence theory argument that women on boards can enhance 
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a  firm’s  connections  with  the  outside  environment  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik, 2003; 
Carter et al, 2003). Also, it supports the agency theory that women on boards are 
 argued to be more risk-averse than men (Levi et al., 2013), especially when   making 
 investment decisions such as mergers and acquisitions (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Levi et 
al., 2013). The firms with women on the boards have lower liabilities (risks)  (Huang 
and Kisgen, 2013). This could be one of the possible explanations on why they  have
 
a higher ROE. 
Furthermore, the interviewees’ insights reflected, also, the different findings.    Some 
 of the interviewees (B1, R3, B5 and R2) supported the presence of women on boards 
 by arguing that women had different decision-making skills; were trustworthy; and 
were committed to the organisation.  Interviewees B2, B6, R1, B7, B9 B4, B3 argued 
that the quality and output of the board members were most likely to be linked to a 
firm’s financial performance. Interviewee R2 said, 
If women have the relevant qualifications, experiences, and competencies, I  do 
believe that they can do wonders, even more than men... Most of the time   they
 
 can   make   hard   decisions,   when   they   understand   something   and  their 
 conscience tells them it  is  the  right  thing they  are  doing,  they  are  able   to 
pursue it. 
(Interviewee R2). 
Board Skill 
There  is  an  insignificant  relationship  between  the  proportion  of  directors    with 
 doctoral  qualifications  and  financial  performance  (see  Table  4).    Consequently, 
 hypothesis  H5,  which  predicts  a  positive  relationship  between  board  skill    and 
financial performance, is rejected. The results are in line with the previous findings 
of Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2012) and Kim and Rasheed (2014) and not  consistent
 
 with those of Ujunwa (2012) and Francis et al. (2015). The findings do not support 
 the  argument  from  resource  dependence  that  directors  can  bring  to  the     board 
knowledge and skills that are essential for monitoring, advising and decision-making 
 (Jhunjhunwala  and  Mishra,  2012;  Kim  and  Rasheed,  2014).  In  this  regard, 
 interviewee B3 argued, 
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The appointment of directors is not being done transparently; people are not 
 being  appointed  the  board  on  their  respective  merit.  A  director  should be 
 appointed to a board knowing that there is a certain contribution that he/she is 
required to make. 
(Interviewee B3)
 
 Some of the interviewees asserted that some Tanzanian firms appointed academic 
 directors, such as professors, to their boards in order to increase status (B4, B5 and 
B6). This might result in ineffective highly educated directors. 
Foreign directors 
Hypothesis  H6  predicts  a  positive  relationship  between  foreign  directors       and 
financial performance. However, the findings (see Table 4) indicate that there is no 
 link   between   the   proportion   of   foreign   directors   and   the   firm’s     financial 
 performance. Consequently, the hypothesis is rejected. The insignificant of foreign 
directors variable, although not consistent with Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) and 
Masulis (2012), is consistent with prior findings of Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2012).
 
 Inconsistent  with  resource  dependence  and  agency  theories,  the  findings  do not 
 support Ujunwa’s (2012) argument that foreign directors minimise agency  problems 
and provide access to foreign capital, contacts, networks and expertise. The results 
 are in line with some interviewees’ views that a director’s nationality does not have a 
 significant influence on financial performance. Interviewees B2, B3, B4, B7, B8 and 
R2 claimed that competency mattered more than the directors’ nationalities since 
some  of  their  appointments  were  based  on  the  influence  of  the  foreign owners. 
Consequently, some of the foreign directors may not have an appropriate expertise. 
Robustness Analysis 
This subsection addresses the potential endogeneity problems such as non-monotonic
 
 relationships;  these  may  lead  to  possibly  misleading  OLS  findings. Endogeneity 
 occurs when there is a correlation between independent variables and an error term 
in a statistical model (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012). Simultaneity 
 and omitted variables are among the common causes of endogeneity problems in 
 corporate governance research (Ntim et al., 2012). Previous studies argued that a 
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ROA ROE 
board structure was to be determined endogenously (e.g. Bhagat and Black; 2002; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ntim, 2015). Similar with Guest (2009) and Ntim (2013). 
 Therefore, we used fixed effect regression analysis (see Table 5), to address the 
 likely impact on an unobserved firm’s related heterogeneities, such as culture, on 
both board characteristics and financial performance variable. 
  In order to address the issue of omitted variables, this study, in line with previous 
 studies, adopted the approaches of instrumental variables through 2SLS (Bhagat  and 
Black, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015) and fixed effects regression (Ntim, 
2015). 
Table 5: Fixed Effect Regression Results 
** At 5% level of significance and *** at 1% level of significance respectively 
 B T Sig. B T Sig. 
Constant 0.660 3.042 0.003*** 1.030 2.159 0.034** 
Outside 0.174 1.292 0.201 0.265 0.898 0.372 
directors       
Board -0.010 -1.455 0.150 -0.006 -0.388 0.699 
size       
CEO 
duality 
-0.224 -3.654 0.001*** -0.356 -2.649 0.010** 
Gender 0.254 1.741 0.086 0.726 2.260 0.027** 
diversity       
Foreign 0.117 1.460 0.149 0.140 0.791 0.431 
directors       
Board 0.225 1.235 0.221 0.478 1.190 0.238 
skill 
Firm -0.044 -5.331 0.000*** -0.012 -0.678 0.500 
Debt       
Firm age -0.035 -0.691 0.492 -0.078 -0.697 0.488 
Firm size -0.050 -2.416 0.018** -0.093 -2.066 0.043** 
R2  0.549   0.306  
Adjusted  0.491   0.217  
R2       
F 
statistics 
 9.476***   3.433***  
N  80   80  
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ROA ROE 
Similar  with  Jackling  and  Johl  (2009),  this  study  applied  lagged  values  of 
 explanatory variables (LAGBOUTSIDE, LAGBSIZE, LAGCEOD,    LAGFEMDIR,
 
 LAGBSKILL,   LAGFODIR,   LAGFEDEBT,   LAGFMSIZE,   LAGFMAGE)   and 
 controls  variables  of  FDEBT,  FMAGE  and  FMSIZE.  In  order  to  ensure      the 
 appropriateness  of  the  2SLS,  these  variables  were  tested  to  check  whether they 
  correlated with the error term in the model. The findings (Appendix 2) show that 
 there is no association between the IV and error term. The uses of lagged values as 
 IV are consistent with Jackling and Johl’s (2009) previous corporate governance 
studies). 
Table 6: 2SLS Regression Results 
** At 5% level of significance and *** at 1% level of significance respectively 
 Tables  5  and  6  indicate  the  results  of  the  fixed  effect  regressions  and       2SLS 
 regressions. These results are similar to the OLS results. For example, CEO duality 
and Firm debt relate negatively to financial performance. However, while unrelated to 
 
 
(Constant) 
B 
0.518 
T 
1.686 
Sig. 
0.096 
B 
0.61 
T 
0.929 
Sig. 
0.356 
Firm Debt -0.038 -3.802 0.000** -0.002 -0.089 0.929 
Firm Size -0.032 -1.284 0.204 -0.054 -1.028 0.308 
Firm Age -0.064 -0.941 0.350 -0.121 -0.83 0.409 
Board Size -0.008 -0.849 0.399 0.001 0.049 0.961 
Outside Directors 0.285 1.118 0.268 0.576 1.054 0.296 
CEO duality -0.275 -2.734 0.008** -0.467 -2.172 0.033* 
Foreign Directors 0.062 0.493 0.624 0.08 0.297 0.768 
Board Skill 0.009 0.023 0.982 -0.153 -0.184 0.854 
Gender Diversity 0.35 1.203 0.233 1.017 1.635 0.107 
R2  48.40%   25.50%  
Adjusted R2  41.70%   15.80%  
  7.197*     
F Sign  *   2.623*  
No. Of Observations  78   78  
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ROA the 2SLS results indicate a positive weak link between gender diversity and 
ROE. Since magnitude and direction of both sets of coefficients appear similar,   OLS 
regression results are reasonably robust to the endogeneity tests results. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A board of directors is argued to be a backbone of corporate governance since an
effective  board  enhances  sound  corporate  governance.  Most  of  the  key corporate 
failures and financial scandals have resulted from agency problems due to  ineffective 
 boards (Tricker, 2012). Agency theory, the key corporate governance theory argues 
 that an effective board of directors is the essential mechanism to minimise agency 
problems.  Corporate  governance  reforms,  such  as  codes  of  corporate governance, 
guidelines, and regulations, aim to enhance the board’s effectiveness (Ujunwa, 2012).
 
 Most  of  the  corporate  governance  studies  provide  insights  about  the  board   and 
 financial performance relationship in developed countries whilst there are very few 
insights  regarding  board  characteristics  and  financial  performance  relationship  in 
 developing countries and, especially, in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tsamenyi et al, 2007). 
In order to respond to Kang et al.’s (2007) recommendation, this study examined   the
impact of board characteristics on the Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance 
by using agency and resource dependence theories. A single theory cannot explain the 
 linkage between the firm’s board characteristics and financial performance   (Jackling 
 and Johl, 2009). 
The  agency  theory  is  partially  supported  by  the  finding  that  CEO  duality  has a
 
 negative impact. The findings support, also, resource dependence theory by arguing 
 that gender diversity has a positive impact on the financial performance. Moreover, 
other board characteristics of outside directors, board size, foreign directors and board 
 skills have no relationship with the firm’s financial performance. It could be argued 
 that lack of independence and the right expertise might be among of the reasons for 
this insignificant relationship. 
 The findings contribute to the understanding of the relationship between corporate 
 governance and financial performance by using, for the first time, Tanzanian data that 
offers new empirical evidence in an emerging country. Furthermore, the study was 
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premised  on  the  use  of  mixed  methods  methodology,  which  is  the    uncommon 
approach in corporate governance research to provide appropriate responses to the 
 research questions. By using agency and resource dependence theories, this study 
 explains, also, how the integrative multi-theory approach works using Tanzanian data. 
In   terms   of   practical   implications,  the   study   offers   essential   contributions to 
   policymakers. Our findings are in line with those of Kang et al. (2007) and provide 
 evidence  to  Tanzanian  policymakers  that  not  all  developed  countries’    corporate 
governance practices are applicable to developing countries. The firms should    adopt 
corporate governance  practices  that have a  significant  influence on  their   financial 
 performance. Therefore, in order to improve Tanzania’s corporate governance, it is 
 recommended that the country develop corporate governance practices that reflect   its 
specific business environment. Moreover, Tanzanian corporate governance 
 institutions  should  improve  the  openness  and  transparency  of  their        directors’ 
 appointment  processes  and  they  should  conduct  more  capacity  building   training  
 among directors. The findings can be used, also, by corporate governance  institutions 
to raise awareness of the advantages of the Tanzanian listed firms separating the roles 
 of CEO and COB. The findings may suggest, also, a need for Tanzanian corporate 
 governance  institutions  and  boards  of  directors  to  recognise  the  importance  of a 
gender-balanced board. 
 This study faced the limitations of its quantitative data sample size, although we  tried 
 to collect data as fully and accurately as possible. Thus, this study’s findings of this 
study  may  not  be  applicable  to  either  non-listed  and  state-owned  enterprises   or 
organisations outside Tanzania. As mentioned above, the sample size is a challenge in
 
 many developing countries (Weekes-Marshall, 2014). For further studies,    non-listed 
 companies and state-owned enterprises should be included in order to increase the 
sample size. 
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